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IN T H E  E ST A T E  O F N EW LA N D  (19=52) l.A .E .R . 841.
W ill — Seaman at sea — Document made in Contemplation of voyage
Under English testamentary legislation (1) a soldier being in 
actual military service, and a manner or seaman being at sea, may make 
a testamentary disposition of his real and personal estate, either orally 
or by a writing, although not complying with the W ills Act. These 
persons may also make a testamentary disposition of real and personal 
estate at the age of fourteen.
In In The Estate of Newland, Ian Frederick Charles Newland, a 
seaman, though under twenty-one, had made a will, otherwise validly 
executed. In view of Newland’s age, the will could be admitted to 
probate only if it was the will of “a seaman being at sea”. That he 
was a “mariner or seaman” was not in dispute. These words in an 
earlier Irish case(2) were held to mean “any perron cmplovcd in any 
branch of the Royal Navy or the Merchant Naw from the highest to 
the lowest”. The problem here was whether Newland was a seaman 
“being at sea” when he made the disputed instrument.
Newland joined the S.S. Strathmore as an apprentice in April 1944 
and continued tc serve in that vessel until October 1944. During the 
war the Strathmore was engaged as a troopship between England and 
India. On July 4, 1944 she was in dock at Liverpool. On July 25, 
1944 the deceased while on leave in England with the approval of his 
employers, the owners of the ship, executed a will in compliance with 
the formalities required by the W ills Act, 1837. At the time the will 
was made no sailing date had been set for the ship. Newland rejoined 
his ship on or before August 4, 1944 on which date the ship sailed on 
a new voyage. He died on August 8, 1951 at Madras, India.
Mr. Justice Havers was unable to find a principle of universal 
application by which to interpret the term “seaman being at sea”. In 
fact the courts have interpreted the words liberally. The privilege 
extends to a person in maritime service serving on board a vessel per­
manently stationed in a harbour (3), or on service in a river (4); and 
a will made in the course of a vovage may in fact be made on shore (5). 
Mr. Justice Havers applied In The Goods of Hale in deciding that 
the deceased Newland was a “seaman being at sea” when he made his 
will between vovages in England. Newland was declared to be a “sea­
man being at sea” because he was in the employment of the steamship 
company when he made the will and was then in contemplation 
of sailing on a fresh voyage.
• 11 T h e W ills A ct, 1837, 1 V iet c. 26, s. 11 (Im p .:)  W ills (So ld iers  and Sa ilo rs) A ct. 1918, 7 
and 8 G eo. 5, c. 58, ss. 1 and 3 (Im p ;I th e  N .B . W ills A ct, 14 G eo. 6, c. 172, s. 4 subs. 
(1) provides th a t  “ th e w ill of any  m arin e r or seam an  w h en  a t sea or in th e  cou rse 
o f a voy ag e, m ay  be m ade by w ritin g  signed b y  him  or by som e o th er p erlo n  in 
his presen ce and by his d irection  w ith ou t an y  fu rth e r  fo rm ality  or any  req u irem en t 
as to  th e p resen ce  o f or a ttesta tio n  or s ig n atu re  by  an y  w itn ess”
(2) In  T h e  G oods o f H ale 11915) 2 I . R. 362
(3) In  T h e  G oods o f M cM urdo (1868), 17 L . T . 393.
(4) In  T h e  G oods o f A u sten  (1853), 1J3 E . R . 1431.
(5) In  T h e  G oods o f L ay  (1840). 163 R . 444.
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Mr. Justice Havers seemed to base liis decision on the fact that, 
though the will was made 011 shore and not during a leave in the coursc 
of a voyage, the testator had in contemplation a future vovagc to take 
place within a reasonable time. This was the decisive factor in I11 
The Goods of Hale. There the deceased ladv was engaged by the 
Cunard Steamship Company as permanent tvpist of the Lusitania, 
and when she was not actuallv sailing on board the Lusitania she 
worked 111 the office at Liverpool. She had been notified that she 
would have to sail in the vessel. The ship was to sail on Januarv 16th, 
and 011 Januarv Htli and 15th she made the three documents which 
were set up as a seaman’s will, l ’he Irish Courts held that she was a 
“seaman” and that she was at sea, because she was definitely engaged 
to commcncc her vovagc, although she had not actually commenced it. 
It was evident from the documents of Januarv 14th and 1 Stli that 
she intended to sail 011 January 16th. The reasoning of the judgment 
was based 011 analogy to the eases involving soldiers wills; in those o.scs 
if a man has definitely taken the first step to go 011 a military expedi­
tion lie is said to be in actual military service; by parity of reasoning, 
the lady having taken the first step to go 011 board the Lusitania was 
said to be at sea.
T he facts in the Hale case appear to be distinguishable from those 
in In the Estate of Newland; the will in the latter was made between 
vovagcs with the date of the oncoming vovagc indefinite; 111 the former 
the will was made 011 the eve of a definite sailing.
The decision of Mr. Justice Ilorridgc in In the Estate of Bowly (6) 
was not referred to in the Newland case but the facts arc similar. The 
facts in In the Estate of Bowly arc sketchy; there, a gentleman who 
was employed as a lieutenant on the Mediterranean Squadron came up 
to London for five days to be married. Then lie went back and joined 
his ship. I11 those circumstanccs, was he a seaman being at sea when 
he made a will during his leave? I11 deciding that this man was not a 
seaman being at sea when lie made the will while in London Mr. 
Justice Ilorridgc said: “It was 110 portion of his duty as a seaman, ancl 
it was not in the coursc of a vovagc. It was a distinct and separate 
occasion, 011 which he left his ship and went to London ancl got mar­
ried and went back”.
Both Newland and the gentleman from the Mediterranean were 
011 leave with the consent of their employers. Neither was 011 shore 
in the course of a vovagc. Newland was waiting on a vovagc to start; 
his ship had been in clock in Liverpool from July 4th till around 
August 1st when it sailed, five or six clays after Newland had made the 
will 011 July 25th. The gentleman from the Mediterranean was on 
leave for five days at the most, the time granted bv his employers, ancl 
then he went back to his ship, and in that five dav period lie made his
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will; lie was dcclarcd not to be a seaman being at sea. ' I lie decisions do 
not seem reconcilable.
The Court however applied In The Goods of Hale; the result of 
the application it seems, widens the scope of the already liberal inter­
pretation given by the Courts to the term “mariner or seaman being 
at sea”.
Terence V . Kelly, Law III U .N .B.
Re E L L IO T T  (deceased). LLO Y D S BANK, L T D . v. B U R TO N  -  
O N —T R E N T  H O SPITA L M A N A G EM EN T C O M M IT T E E
AND O T H E R S
W ill — Condition Precedent — Illegal Condition — G ift of Personality 
Subject Thereto — Malum Prohibitum and not Malum In Se -- 
Validity of G ift
The recent case of Re Elliott (deceased) Lloyd’s Bank l  td. v. 
Burton-On-Trent Hospital Management Committee et A1 (1952) 
1 A.E.R. 145, is of interest. It provides an example of the adoption 
by courts of equity of a civil law doctrine involving the distinction of 
malum in se and malum prohibitum in reference to conditions pre­
cedent and personal property.
*•
The facts of the ease are that the testator, Arthur Elliott, by 
his will appointed the plaintiff bank to be executor and trustee and 
directed the bank to convert the whole of his estate, both real and 
personal, into money. After payment of his debts and funeral and 
testamentary expenses, he gave the sum of £100 to the Burton-On- 
Trent Infirmary to be invested as the trustee should direct “for the 
purpose of maintaining and renovating my grave and headstone, sub­
ject to the Burton-On-Trent Infirmary accepting the above £100 and 
the terms as above attaching thereto then I give to the said Burton- 
On-Trent Infirmary the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to 
be applied to the general purposes of the said infirmary.”
From the facts it will be apparent that this was not an absolute 
gift but rather a gift subject to a condition precedent under which the 
infirmary was to take the residue only if it accepted the legacy of 
£100 and also the terms, which were to maintain and renovate the 
testator’s grave and headstone.
The Court held that on construction of the will, the legacy of 
£100 was intended to be set apart in perpetuity for maintaining the 
testator’s grave, and, therefore, it was void as transgressing the rule 
against perpetuities and thus the condition precedent attached to 
the gift of residue was an illegal one which the residuary legatee 
could not lawfully carry into effect.
